wahyu putra (21207149) 3EB03

Accounting and Business Research, International Accounting Policy Forum. pp. 5-27. 2006 5
International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS): pros and cons for investors

Ray Ball*

Abstract—Accounting in shaped by economic and political forces. It follows that increased worldwide integration
of both markets and politics (driven by reductions in communications and information processing costs) makes increased
integration of financial reporting standards and practice almost inevitable. But most market and political
forces will remain local for the foreseeable future, so it is unclear how much convergence in actual financial reporting
practice will (or should) occur. Furthermore, there is little settled theory or evidence on which to build an
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of uniform accounting rules within a country, let alone internationally.
The pros and cons of IFRS therefore are somewhat conjectural, the unbridled enthusiasm of allegedly altruistic
proponents notwithstanding. On the ‘pro’ side of the ledger, I conclude that extraordinary success has been
achieved in developing a comprehensive set of ‘high quality’ IFRS standards, in persuading almost 100 countries
to adopt them, and in obtaining convergence in standards with important non-adopters (notably, the US). On the
‘con’ side, I envisage problems with the current fascination of the IASB (and the FASB) with ‘fair value accounting’.
A deeper concern is that there inevitably will be substantial differences among countries in implementation of
IFRS, which now risk being concealed by a veneer of uniformity. The notion that uniform standards alone will produce
uniform financial reporting seems naive. In addition, I express several longer run concerns. Time will tell.





1. Introduction and outline
It is a distinct pleasure to deliver the 2005 PD
Leake Lecture, and I sincerely thank the Institute
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
(ICAEW) for inviting me to do so. PD Leake was
an early contributor to a then fledgling but now
mature accounting literature. His work on goodwill
(Leake, 1921a,b) stands apart from its contemporaries,
so it is an honour to celebrate the
contributions of such a pioneer. My introduction to
Leake’s work came from a review article
(Carsberg, 1966) that I read almost 40 years ago.
Ironically, the review was published in a journal I
now co-edit (Journal of Accounting Research),
and was written by a man who later became a pioneer
in what now are known as International
Financial Reporting Standards (the subject of this
lecture), and with whom I once co-taught a course
on International Accounting (here in London, at
London Business School). It truly is a small world
in many ways – which goes a long way to explaining
the current interest in international standards.
International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) are forefront on the immediate agenda because,
starting in 2005, listed companies in
European Union countries are required to report
consolidated financial statements prepared according
to IFRS. At the time of speaking, companies
are preparing for the release of their first full-year
IFRS-compliant financial statements. Investors
have seen interim reports based on IFRS, but have
not yet experienced the full gamut of year-end adjustments
that IFRS might trigger. Consequently,
the advantages and disadvantages of IFRS for investors
(the specific topic of this lecture) are a
matter of current conjecture. I shall try to shed
some light on the topic but, as the saying goes,
only time will tell.
1.1. Outline
I begin with a description of IFRS and their history,
and warn that there is little settled theory or
evidence on which to build an assessment of the
advantages and disadvantages of uniform accounting
rules within a country, let alone internationally.
The pros and cons of IFRS therefore are
somewhat conjectural, the unbridled enthusiasm of
allegedly altruistic proponents notwithstanding. I
then outline my broad framework for addressing
the issues, which is economic and political.
On the ‘pro’ side of the ledger, I conclude that
extraordinary success has been achieved in developing
a comprehensive set of ‘high quality’ standards
and in persuading almost 100 countries to
adopt them. On the ‘con’ side, a deep concern is
that the differences in financial reporting quality
Accounting and Business Research, International Accounting Policy Forum. pp. 5-27. 2006 5
International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS): pros and cons for investors
Ray Ball*
Abstract—Accounting in shaped by economic and political forces. It follows that increased worldwide integration
of both markets and politics (driven by reductions in communications and information processing costs) makes increased
integration of financial reporting standards and practice almost inevitable. But most market and political
forces will remain local for the foreseeable future, so it is unclear how much convergence in actual financial reporting
practice will (or should) occur. Furthermore, there is little settled theory or evidence on which to build an
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of uniform accounting rules within a country, let alone internationally.
The pros and cons of IFRS therefore are somewhat conjectural, the unbridled enthusiasm of allegedly altruistic
proponents notwithstanding. On the ‘pro’ side of the ledger, I conclude that extraordinary success has been
achieved in developing a comprehensive set of ‘high quality’ IFRS standards, in persuading almost 100 countries
to adopt them, and in obtaining convergence in standards with important non-adopters (notably, the US). On the
‘con’ side, I envisage problems with the current fascination of the IASB (and the FASB) with ‘fair value accounting’.
A deeper concern is that there inevitably will be substantial differences among countries in implementation of
IFRS, which now risk being concealed by a veneer of uniformity. The notion that uniform standards alone will produce
uniform financial reporting seems naive. In addition, I express several longer run concerns. Time will tell.
*The author is Sidney Davidson Professor of Accounting at
the University of Chicago. His paper is based on the PD Leake
Lecture delivered on 8 September 2005 at the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, which can be
accessed at http://www.icaew.co.uk/index.cfm?route=112609.
It draws extensively on the framework in Ball (1995) and benefited
from comments by Steve Zeff. Financial support from
the PD Leake Trust and the Graduate School of Business at
the University of Chicago is gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence should be addressed to Professor Ball at the
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 S.
Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637. Tel. +00 1 (773) 834
5941; E-mail: ray.ball@gsb.uchicago.edu
that are inevitable among countries have been
pushed down to the level of implementation, and
now will be concealed by a veneer of uniformity.
The notion that uniform standards alone will produce
uniform financial reporting seems naïve, if
only because it ignores deep-rooted political and
economic factors that influence the incentives of
financial statement preparers and that inevitably
shape actual financial reporting practice. I envisage
problems with the current fascination of the
IASB (and the FASB) for ‘fair value accounting’.
In addition, I express several longer run concerns.
2. Background
2.1. What are IFRS?
IFRS are accounting rules (‘standards’) issued
by the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB), an independent organisation based in
London, UK. They purport to be a set of rules that
ideally would apply equally to financial reporting
by public companies worldwide. Between 1973
and 2000, international standards were issued by
the IASB’s predecessor organisation, the
International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC), a body established in 1973 by the professional
accountancy bodies in Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands,
United Kingdom and Ireland, and the United
States. During that period, the IASC’s rules were
described as ‘International Accounting Standards’
(IAS). Since April 2001, this rule-making function
has been taken over by a newly-reconstituted
IASB.1 The IASB describes its rules under the new
label ‘International Financial Reporting
Standards’ (IFRS), though it continues to recognise
(accept as legitimate) the prior rules (IAS) issued
by the old standard-setter (IASC).2 The IASB
is better-funded, better-staffed and more independent
than its predecessor, the IASC. Nevertheless,
there has been substantial continuity across time in
its viewpoint and in its accounting standards.3
2.2. Brave New World
I need to start by confessing substantial ignorance
on the desirability of mandating uniform accounting,
and to caution that as a consequence
much of what I have to say is speculative. There
simply is not much hard evidence or resolved theory
to help.
This was an unsettled issue when I was an accounting
student, over 40 years ago. A successful
push for mandating uniformity at a national level
occurred around the turn of the twentieth century.
National uniformity was a central theme of the
first Congress of Accountants in 1904.4 A century
later, there is an analogous push for mandating
uniformity at an international level, but in the
meantime no substantial, settled body of evidence
or literature has emerged in favour – or against –
uniformity in accounting standards, at least to my
knowledge.5
There thus is good reason (and, I will argue
below, some evidence) to be sceptical of the strong
claims that its advocates make for a single global
set of accounting standards. So while this means
Europe’s adoption of IFRS is a leap of faith, it also
means it is a Brave New World for commentators
on IFRS, myself included. I therefore caution that
the following views are informed more by basic
tenets of economics (and some limited evidence)
than by a robust, directly-relevant body of research.
2.3. Some thoughts on the role of mandatory uniform
accounting standards
IFRS boosters typically take the case for mandatory
(i.e., required by state enactment) uniform
(i.e., required of all public companies) accounting
standards as self evident. In this regard, they are
not alone: in my experience, most accounting textbooks,
most accounting teachers and much of the
accounting literature are in the same boat. But the
case for imposing accounting uniformity by fiat is
far from clear. Some background analysis of the
economic role of mandatory uniform accounting
standards, one hopes, will assist the reader in sorting
through claims as to the pros and cons of the
European Union mandating of IFRS.
Voluntary standards. The fundamental economic
function of accounting standards is to provide
‘agreement about how important commercial
transactions are to be implemented’ (Ball,
1995:19). For example, if lenders agree to lend to
a company under the condition that its debt financing
will not exceed 60% of tangible assets, it
helps to have agreement on how to count the company’s
tangible assets as well as its debts. Are noncancellable
leases debt? Unfunded health care
commitments to employees? Expected future tax
payments due to transactions that generate book
income now? Similarly, if a company agrees to
provide audited profit figures to its shareholders, it
is helpful to be in agreement as to what constitutes
a profit. Specifying the accounting methods to be
6 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
1 The International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC) Foundation was incorporated in 2001 as a not-forprofit
corporation in the State of Delaware, US. The IASC
Foundation is the legal parent of the International Accounting
Standards Board.
2 For convenience, I will refer to all standards recognised by
the IASB as IFRS.
3 The IASB account of its history can be found at
http://www.iasb.org/about/history.asp.
4 The proceedings of the Congress can be found on the website
of the 10th World Congress of Accounting Historians:
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aah/worldcongress/highlights.
htm. See also Staub (1938).
5 The available literature includes Dye (1985), Farrell and
Saloner (1985), Dye and Verrecchia (1995) and Pownall and
Schipper (1999).
followed constitutes an agreement as to how to implement
important financial and legal concepts
such as leverage (gearing) and earnings (profit).
Accounting methods thus are an integral component
of the contracting between firms and other
parties, including lenders, shareholders, managers,
suppliers and customers.
Failure to specify accounting methods ex ante
has the potential to create uncertainty in the payoffs
to both contracting parties. For example, failure
to agree in advance whether unfunded health
care commitments to employees are to be counted
as debt leaves both the borrower and the lender unsure
as to how much debt the borrower can have
without violating a leverage covenant. Similarly,
failure to specify in advance the rules for counting
profits creates uncertainty for investors when they
receive a profit report, and raises the cost of capital
to the firm. But accounting standards are costly
to develop and specify in advance, so they cannot
be a complete solution. Economic efficiency implies
a trade-off, without a complete set of standards
that fully determine financial reporting
practice in all future states of the world (i.e., exactly
and for all contingencies). Some future states
of the world are extremely costly to anticipate and
explicitly contract for.6 Standards thus have their
limits.
The alternative to fully specifying ex ante the accounting
standards to meet every future state of the
world requires what I call ‘functional completion’
(Ball, 1989). Independent institutions then are inserted
between the firm and its financial statement
users, their function being to decide ex post on the
accounting standards that would most likely have
been specified ex ante if the actually realised state
had been anticipated and provided for. Prominent
examples of independent institutions that play this
role in contracting include law courts, arbitrators,
actuaries, valuers and auditors. When deciding
what would most likely have been specified ex
ante if the realised state had been anticipated and
provided for, some information is contained in
what was anticipated and provided for. This information
will include provisions that were specified
for similar states to that which occurred. It also
will include abstract general provisions that were
intended for all states. In financial reporting, this is
the issue involved in so-called ‘principles-based’
accounting: the balance between general and specific
provision for future states of the world.
Uniform voluntary standards. I am aware of at
least three major advantages of uniform (here interpreted
as applying equally to all public companies)
standards that would cause them to emerge
voluntarily (i.e., without state fiat). The first advantage
– scale economies – underlies all forms of
uniform contracting: uniform rules need only be
invented once. They are a type of ‘public good’, in
that the marginal cost of an additional user adopting
them is zero. The second advantage of uniform
standards is the protection they give auditors
against managers playing an ‘opinion shopping’
game. If all auditors are required to enforce the
same rules, managers cannot threaten to shop for
an auditor who will give an unqualified opinion on
a more favourable rule. The third advantage is
eliminating informational externalities arising
from lack of comparability. If firms and/or countries
use different accounting techniques – even if
unambiguously disclosed to all users – they can
impose costs on others (in the language of economics,
create negative externalities) due to lack
of comparability. To the extent that firms internalise
these effects, it will be advantageous for
them to use the same standards as others.
These advantages imply that some degree of uniformity
in accounting standards could be expected
to arise in a market (i.e., non-fiat) setting. This is
what happened historically: as is the case for most
professions, uniform accounting standards initially
arose in a market setting, before governments became
involved. In the UK, the ICAEW functioned
as a largely market-based standard-setter until recently.
In the US, the American Association of
Public Accountants – the precursor to today’s
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
– was formed in 1887 as a professional body without
state fiat. In 1939, the profession accepted government
licensure and bowed to pressure from the
SEC to establish a Committee on Accounting
Procedure. The CAP issued 51 Accounting
Research Bulletins before being replaced in 1959
by the AICPA’s Accounting Principles Board
(APB), which in turn was replaced in 1973 by the
current FASB. While the trend has been to increased
regulation (fiat) over time, the origin of
uniform accounting standards lies in a voluntary,
market setting.7
There also are at least three important reasons to
expect somewhat less-than-uniform accounting
methods to occur in a voluntary setting. First, it is
not clear that uniform financial reporting quality
requires uniform accounting rules (‘one size fits
all’). Uniformity in the eyes of the user could require
accounting rules that vary across firms,
across locations and across time. Firms differ on
myriad dimensions such as strategy, investment
policy, financing policy, industry, technology, capital
intensity, growth, size, political scrutiny, and
geographical location. The types of transactions
they enter into differ substantially. Countries differ
International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 7
6 In the extreme case of presently unimaginable future
states, it is infinitely costly (i.e., impossible, even with infinite
resources) to explicitly contract for optimal state-contingent
payoffs, including those affected by financial reporting.
7 Watts and Zimmerman (1986) note the market origins of
financial reporting and auditing more generally.
in how they run their capital, labour and product
markets, and in the extent and nature of governmental
and political involvement in them. It has
never been convincingly demonstrated that there
exists a unique optimum set of rules for all.
Second, as observed above it is costly to develop
a fully detailed set of accounting standards to cover
every feasible contingency, so standards are not the
only way of solving accounting method choices.
Some type of ‘functional completion’ is required.
For example, under ‘principles based’ accounting,
general principles rather than detailed standards are
developed in advance and then adapted to specific
situations with the approval of independent auditors.
It therefore is not optimal for all accounting
choices to be made according to uniform standards.
The above-mentioned reasons to expect less than
uniform accounting methods in a voluntary setting
share the property that uniformity is not the optimal
way to go. The third reason, that firms and/or
countries using different accounting methods
might not fully internalise the total costs imposed
on others due to lack of comparability, does not
have that property. It therefore provides a rationale
for mandating uniformity, to which I now turn.
Mandatory uniform standards are a possible solution
to the problem of informational externalities.
If their use of different accounting methods
imposes costs on others that firms and/or countries
do not take into account in their decisions, then it
is feasible that the state can improve aggregate
welfare by imposing uniformity. Whether the
state-imposed solution can be expected to be optimal
is another matter. Political factors tend to distort
state action, a theme I shall return to.
At a more basic level, it is not clear that imperfect
comparability in financial reporting practice is
a substantial problem requiring state action. Is accounting
information a special economic good?
Hotel accommodation, for example, differs enormously
in quality. Different hotels and hotel chains
differ in the standards they set and the rules they
apply. Their rooms are not comparable in size or
decor, their elevators do not operate at comparable
speed, their staffs are not equally helpful, they
have different cancellation policies, etc. There is
no direct comparability of one hotel room with another,
even with the assistance of the myriad rating
systems in the industry, but consumers make
choices without the dire consequences frequently
alleged to occur from differences in accounting
rules. All things considered, the case for imposing
accounting uniformity by fiat is far from clear.
2.4. Why is international convergence in
accounting standards occurring now?
Accounting is shaped by economics and politics
(Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986), so the
source of international convergence in accounting
standards is increased cross-border integration of
markets and politics (Ball, 1995). Driving this integration
is an extraordinary reduction in the cost
of international communication and transacting.
The cumulative effect of innovations affecting almost
all dimensions of information costs – for example
in computing, software, satellite and
fibre-optic information transmission, the internet,
television, transportation, education – is a revolutionary
plunge in the cost of being informed about
and becoming an actor in the markets and politics
of other countries. In my youth, only a small elite
possessed substantial amounts of current information
about international markets and politics.
Today, orders of magnitude more information is
freely available to all on the internet. Informed
cross-border transacting in product markets and
factor markets (including capital and labour markets)
has grown rapidly as a consequence.
Similarly, voters and politicians are much better
informed about the actions of foreign politicians,
and their consequences, than just a generation ago.
We have witnessed a revolutionary internationalisation
of both markets and politics, and inevitably
this creates a demand for international convergence
in financial reporting.
How far this will go is another matter. Despite
the undoubted integration that has occurred, notably
in the capital and product markets, most market
and political forces are local, and will remain
so for the foreseeable future. Consequently, it is
unclear how much convergence in actual financial
reporting practice will (or should) occur. I return
to this theme below.
3. Scoring IASB against its stated
objectives
This section evaluates the progress the IASB has
made toward achieving its stated objectives, which
include:8
1. ‘develop ... high quality, understandable and enforceable
global accounting standards ... that
require high quality, transparent and comparable
information ... to help participants in the
world’s capital markets and other users ... .’
2. ‘promote the use and rigorous application of
those standards.’
3. ‘bring about convergence ... .’
I discuss progress toward each of these objectives
in turn.
3.1. Development
Here the IASB has done extraordinarily well.9 It
8 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
8 Source: http://www.iasb.org/about/constitution.asp
9 Deloitte & Touche LLP provide a comprehensive review
of IFRS at www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/pubs.htm.
has developed a nearly complete set of standards
that, if followed, would require companies to
report ‘high quality, transparent and comparable
information’.
I interpret financial reporting ‘quality’ in very
general terms, as satisfying the demand for financial
reporting. That is, high quality financial statements
provide useful information to a variety of
users, including investors. This requires:
• accurate depiction of economic reality (for example:
accurate allowance for bad debts; not
ignoring an imperfect hedge);
• low capacity for managerial manipulation;
• timeliness (all economic value added gets
recorded eventually; the question is how
promptly); and
• asymmetric timeliness (a form of conservatism):
timelier incorporation of bad news, relative to
good news, in the financial statements.
Accounting standard-setters historically have
viewed the determinants of ‘quality’ as ‘relevance’
and ‘reliability,’ but I do not find these concepts
particularly useful. For example, IASB and FASB
recently have been placing less emphasis on reliability.
In my view, this arises from a failure to distinguish
reliability that is inherent in the
accounting for a particular type of transaction (the
extent to which a reported number is subject to unavoidable
estimation error) from reliability arising
from capacity for managerial manipulation (the
extent to which a reported number is subject to
self-interested manipulation by management).
Compared to the legalistic, politically and taxinfluenced
standards that historically have typified
Continental Europe, IFRS are designed to:
• reflect economic substance more than legal form;
• reflect economic gains and losses in a more
timely fashion (in some respects, even more so
than US GAAP);
• make earnings more informative;
• provide more useful balance sheets; and
• curtail the historical Continental European discretion
afforded managers to manipulate provisions,
create hidden reserves, ‘smooth’ earnings
and hide economic losses from public view.
The only qualification I would make to my
favourable assessment of IFRS qua standards
therefore is the extent to which they are imbued by
a ‘mark to market’ philosophy, an issue to which I
return below.
3.2. Promotion
Here the IASB also has experienced remarkable
success. Indicators of this success include:
• Almost 100 countries now require or allow
IFRS. Acomplete list, provided by Deloitte and
Touche LLP (2006), is provided in Figure 1.
• All listed companies in EU member countries
are required to report consolidated financial
statements complying with IFRS, effective in
2005.10
• Many other countries are replacing their national
standards with IFRS for some or all domestic
companies.
• Other countries have adopted a policy of reviewing
IFRS and then adopting them either
verbatim or with minor modification as their
national standards.
• The International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), the international organisation
of national securities regulators, has
recommended that its members permit foreign
issuers to use IFRS for cross-border securities
offerings and listings.
The IASB has been tireless in promoting IFRS at
a political level, and its efforts have paid off handsomely
in terms ranging from endorsement to
mandatory adoption. Whether political action
translates into actual implementation is another
matter, discussed below.
3.3. Convergence
Convergence refers to the process of narrowing
differences between IFRS and the accounting standards
of countries that retain their own standards.
Depending on local political and economic factors,
these countries could require financial reporting to
comply with their own standards without formally
recognising IFRS, they could explicitly prohibit
reporting under IFRS, they could permit all companies
to report under either IFRS or domestic
standards, or they could require domestic companies
to comply with domestic standards and permit
only cross-listed foreign companies to comply
with either. Convergence can offer advantages,
whatever the reason for retaining domestic standards.
It is a modified version of adoption.
Several countries that have not adopted IFRS at
this point have established convergence projects
that most likely will lead to their acceptance of
IFRS, in one form or another, in the not too distant
future. Most notably:
International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 9
10 The regulation was adopted on 19 July 2002 by the
European Parliament and Council (EC)1606/2002. After extensive
political lobbying and debate, the EC ‘carved out’ two
sections of IAS 39, while at the same time announcing this action
as exceptional and temporary, and reiterating its support
for IFRS.
10 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Figure 1
Use of IFRSs around the world
Use of IFRSs for domestic reporting by listed companies as of February 2006.
Source: Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu, IFRS in Your Pocket 2006, fifth edition, April,
at: http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/pocket2006.pdf.
• Since October 2002, the IASB and the FASB
have been working systematically toward convergence
of IFRS and US GAAP. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
the US national market regulator, has set a target
date no later than 2009 for it accepting financial
statements of foreign registrants that
comply with IFRS.
• The IASB recently commenced a similar,
though seemingly less urgent and ambitious,
convergence project with Japan.
I repeat the caveat that converge de facto is less
certain than convergence de jure: convergence in
actual financial reporting practice is a different
thing than convergence in financial reporting standards.
I return to this point in Section 6 below.
4. Advantages of IFRS for investors
4.1. Direct IFRS advantages for investors
Widespread international adoption of IFRS offers
equity investors a variety of potential advantages.
These include:
1. IFRS promise more accurate, comprehensive
and timely financial statement information, relative
to the national standards they replace for
public financial reporting in most of the countries
adopting them, Continental Europe included.
To the extent that financial statement
information is not known from other sources,
this should lead to more-informed valuation in
the equity markets, and hence lower risk to investors.
2. Small investors are less likely than investment
professionals to be able to anticipate financial
statement information from other sources.
Improving financial reporting quality allows
them to compete better with professionals, and
hence reduces the risk they are trading with a
better-informed professional (known as ‘adverse
selection’).11
3. By eliminating many international differences
in accounting standards, and standardising reporting
formats, IFRS eliminate many of the
adjustments analysts historically have made in
order to make companies’ financials more
comparable internationally. IFRS adoption
therefore could reduce the cost to investors of
processing financial information. The gain
would be greatest for institutions that create
large, standardised-format financial databases.
4. A bonus is that reducing the cost of processing
financial information most likely increases the
efficiency with which the stock market incorporates
it in prices. Most investors can be expected
to gain from increased market
efficiency.
5. Reducing international differences in accounting
standards assists to some degree in removing
barriers to cross-border acquisitions and
divestitures, which in theory will reward investors
with increased takeover premiums.12
In general, IFRS offer increased comparability
and hence reduced information costs and information
risk to investors (provided the standards are
implemented consistently, a point I return to
below).
4.2. Indirect IFRS advantages for investors
IFRS offer several additional, indirect advantages
to investors. Because higher information
quality should reduce both the risk to all investors
from owning shares (see 1. above) and the risk to
less-informed investors due to adverse selection
(see 2. above), in theory it should lead to a reduction
in firms’ costs of equity capital.13 This would
increase share prices, and would make new investments
by firms more attractive, other things equal.
Indirect advantages to investors arise from improving
the usefulness of financial statement information
in contracting between firms and a
variety of parties, notably lenders and managers
(Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
Increased transparency causes managers to act
more in the interests of shareholders. In particular,
timelier loss recognition in the financial statements
increases the incentives of managers to attend
to existing loss-making investments and
strategies more quickly, and to undertake fewer
new investments with negative NPVs, such as
‘pet’ projects and ‘trophy’ acquisitions (Ball 2001;
Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Ball (2004) concludes
this was the primary motive behind the 1993 decision
of Daimler-Benz (now DaimlerChrysler) AG
to list on the New York Stock Exchange and report
financial statements complying with US GAAP:
due to intensifying product market competition
and hence lower profit margins in its core automobile
businesses, Daimler no longer could afford to
subsidise loss-making activities. Bushman et al.
(2006) report evidence that firms in countries with
timelier financial-statement recognition of losses
International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 11
11 See Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Diamond and
Verrecchia (1991) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000).
12 See Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988).
13 The magnitude of cost of capital benefits from disclosure
is an unsettled research question, both theoretically and empirically.
Empirical studies encounter the problem of controlling
for correlated omitted variables, notably companies’
growth opportunities. Theory research is sensitive to model
assumptions, and frequently can offer insights into the direction
but not the magnitude of any effects. See Diamond and
Verrecchia (1991), Botosan (1997), Leuz and Verrecchia
(2000), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Hail (2002), Daske
(2006) and Easton (2006).
are less likely to undertake negative-NPV investments.
The increased transparency and loss recognition
timeliness promised by IFRS therefore
could increase the efficiency of contracting between
firms and their managers, reduce agency
costs between managers and shareholders, and enhance
corporate governance.14 The potential gain
to investors arises from managers acting more in
their (i.e., investors’) interests.
The increased transparency promised by IFRS
also could cause a similar increase in the efficiency
of contracting between firms and lenders. In
particular, timelier loss recognition in the financial
statements triggers debt covenants violations more
quickly after firms experience economic losses
that decrease the value of outstanding debt (Ball
2001, 2004; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Ball et al.,
2006). Timelier loss recognition involves timelier
revision of the book values of assets and liabilities,
as well as earnings and stockholders’ equity, causing
timelier triggering of covenants based on financial
statement variables. In other words, the
increased transparency and loss recognition timeliness
promised by IFRS could increase the efficiency
of contracting in debt markets, with
potential gains to equity investors in terms of reduced
cost of debt capital.
An ambiguous area for investors will be the effect
of IFRS on their ability to forecast earnings.
One school of thought is that better accounting
standards make reported earnings less noisy and
more accurate, hence more ‘value relevant’. Other
things equal (for example, ignoring enforcement
and implementation issues for the moment) this
would make earnings easier to forecast and would
improve average analyst forecast accuracy.15 The
other school of thought reaches precisely the opposite
conclusion. This reasoning is along the lines
that managers in low-quality reporting regimes are
able to ‘smooth’ reported earnings to meet a variety
of objectives, such as reducing the volatility of
their own compensation, reducing the volatility of
payouts to other stakeholders (notably, employee
bonuses and dividends), reducing corporate taxes,
and avoiding recognition of losses.16 In contrast,
earnings in high-quality regimes are more informative,
more volatile, and more difficult to predict.
This argument is bolstered in the case of IFRS
by their emphasis on ‘fair value accounting’, as
outlined in the following section. Fair value accounting
rules aim to incorporate more-timely information
about economic gains and losses on
securities, derivatives and other transactions into
the financial statements, and to incorporate moretimely
information about contemporary economic
losses (‘impairments’) on long term tangible and
intangible assets. IFRS promise to make earnings
more informative and therefore, paradoxically,
more volatile and more difficult to forecast.
In sum, there are a variety of indirect ways in
which IFRS offer benefits to investors. Over the
long term, the indirect advantages of IFRS to investors
could well exceed the direct advantages.
5. Fair value accounting
Amajor feature of IFRS qua standards is the extent
to which they are imbued with fair value accounting
[a.k.a. ‘mark to market’ accounting]. Notably:
• IAS 16 provides a fair value option for property,
plant and equipment;
• IAS 36 requires asset impairments (and impairment
reversals) to fair value;
• IAS 38 requires intangible asset impairments to
fair value;
• IAS 38 provides for intangibles to be revalued
to market price, if available;
• IAS 39 requires fair value for financial instruments
other than loans and receivables that are
not held for trading, securities held to maturity;
and qualifying hedges (which must be nearperfect
to qualify);17
• IAS 40 provides a fair value option for investment
property;
• IFRS 2 requires share-based payments (stock,
options, etc.) to be accounted at fair value; and
• IFRS 3 provides for minority interest to be
recorded at fair value.
This list most likely will be expanded over time.
Both IASB and FASB have signalled their intent to
do so.
I have distinctly mixed views on fair value accounting.
The fundamental case in favour of fair
value accounting seems obvious to most economists:
fair value incorporates more information
into the financial statements. Fair values contain
more information than historical costs whenever
there exist either:
1. Observable market prices that managers cannot
materially influence due to less than perfect
market liquidity; or
12 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
14 These ‘numerator’ effects of higher quality financial reporting
(i.e., increasing the cash flows arising from managers’
actions) in my view are likely to have a considerably larger
influence on firms’ values than any ‘denominator’ effects
(i.e., reducing the cost of capital). See Ball (2001: 140–141).
However, it is difficult to disentangle the two effects in practice.
15 See Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001), Hope (2003) and Lang,
Lins and Miller (2003).
16 See Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) and Ball, Robin and
Wu (2003).
17 Available-for-sale securities are to be shown at Fair Value
in the Balance Sheet only.
2. Independently observable, accurate estimates
of liquid market prices.
Incorporating more information in the financial
statements by definition makes them more informative,
with potential advantages to investors, and
other things equal it makes them more useful for
purposes of contracting with lenders, managers
and other parties.18
Over recent decades, the markets for many commodities
and financial instruments, including derivatives,
have become substantially deeper and
more liquid. Some of these markets did not even
exist 30 years ago. There has been enormous concurrent
growth in electronic databases containing
transactions prices for commodities and securities,
and for a variety of assets such as real estate for
which comparable sales can be used in estimating
fair values. In addition, a variety of methods for reliably
estimating fair values for untraded assets
have become generally acceptable. These include
the present value (discounted cash flow) method,
the first application of which in formal accounting
standards was in lease accounting (SFAS No. 13 in
1976), and a variety of valuation methods adapted
from the original Black-Scholes (1973) model. In
view of these developments, it stands to reason
that accountants have been replacing more and
more historical costs with fair values, obtained
both from liquid market prices and from modelbased
estimates thereof.
The question is whether IASB has pushed (and
intends to push) fair value accounting too far.
There are many potential problems with fair value
in practice, including:19
• Market liquidity is a potentially important issue
in practice. Spreads can be large enough to
cause substantial uncertainty about fair value
and hence introduce noise in the financial statements.
• In illiquid markets, trading by managers can influence
traded as well as quoted prices, and
hence allows them to manipulate fair value estimates.
• Worse, companies tend to have positively correlated
positions in commodities and financial
instruments, and cannot all cash out simultaneously
at the bid price, let alone at the ask. Fair
value accounting has not yet been tested by a
major financial crisis, when lenders in particular
could discover that ‘fair value’ means ‘fair
weather value’.
• When liquid market prices are not available,
fair value accounting becomes ‘mark to model’
accounting. That is, firms report estimates of
market prices, not actual arm’s length market
prices. This introduces ‘model noise,’ due to
imperfect pricing models and imperfect estimates
of model parameters.
• If liquid market prices are available, fair value
accounting reduces opportunities for self-interested
managers to influence the financial statements
by exercising their discretion over
realising gains and losses through the timing of
asset sales. However, fair value accounting increases
opportunities for manipulation when
‘mark to model’ accounting is employed to
simulate market prices, because managers can
influence both the choice of models and the parameter
estimates.
It is important to stress that volatility per se is
not the concern here. Volatility is an advantage in
financial reporting, whenever it reflects timely incorporation
of new information in earnings, and
hence onto balance sheets (in contrast with
‘smoothing,’ which reduces volatility). However,
volatility becomes a disadvantage to investors and
other users whenever it reflects estimation noise
or, worse, managerial manipulation.
The fair value accounting rules in IFRS place
considerable faith in the ‘conceptual framework’
that IASB and FASB are jointly developing
(IASB, 2001). This framework:
• is imbued with a highly controversial ‘value
relevance’ philosophy;
• emphasises ‘relevance’ relative to ‘reliability;’
• assumes the sole purpose of financial reporting
is direct ‘decision usefulness;’
• downplays the indirect ‘stewardship’ role of
accounting; and
• could yet cause IASB and FASB some grief.
IASB and FASB seem determined to push ahead
with it nevertheless. FASB staff member L. Todd
Johnson (2005) concludes:
‘The Board has required greater use of fair value
measurements in financial statements because it
perceives that information as more relevant to investors
and creditors than historical cost information.
Such measures better reflect the present
financial state of reporting entities and better facilitate
assessing their past performance and future
International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 13
18 Ball, Robin and Sadka (2006) conclude from a crosscountry
analysis that providing new information to equity investors
is not the dominant economic function of financial
reporting (investors can be informed about gains and losses in
a timely fashion via disclosure, without financial statement
recognition). Conversely, the dominant function of timely loss
recognition is to facilitate contracting (the study focused on
debt markets).
19 In addition, gains and losses in fair value are transitory in
nature and hence are unlike recurring business income. For example,
they normally will sell at lower valuation multiples. To
avoid misleading investors, fair value gains and losses need to
be clearly labelled as such.
prospects. In that regard, the Board does not accept
the view that reliability should outweigh relevance
for financial statement measures.’
Noisy information on gains and losses is more informative
than none, so even the least reliable ‘mark
to model’ estimates certainly incorporate more information.
But this is not a sufficient basis for justifying
fair value accounting, for at least four reasons:
1. ‘Value relevance’ (i.e., informing users) is by
no means the sole criterion for financial reporting.
One also has to consider the role of financial
reporting in contexts where noise matters,
including debt and compensation contracts
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Holthausen and
Watts, 2001). Noise in any financial information
that affects contractual outcomes (e.g.,
lenders’ rights when leverage ratio or interest
coverage covenants are violated; managers’
bonuses based on reported earnings) increases
the risk faced by both the firm and contracting
parties. Other things equal, it thus is a source of
contracting inefficiency. Providing more information
thus can be worse than providing less,
if it is accompanied by more noise. ‘Mark to
model’ fair value accounting can add volatility
to the financial statements in the form of both
information (a ‘good’) and noise arising from
inherent estimation error and managerial manipulation
(a ‘bad’).
2. It is important to distinguish ‘recognition’ (incorporating
information in the audited financial
statements, notably by including estimated
gains and losses in earnings and book value)
from ‘disclosure’ (informing investors, for example
by audited footnote disclosure or provision
of unaudited information, without
incorporation in earnings or on balance sheets).
Noisy fair value information does not necessarily
have to be recognised to be useful to equity
investors.20 The case for increased deployment
of fair value accounting in the audited financial
statements is not based on any substantial body
of evidence – at least of which I am aware – that
gain and loss information is not available from
sources outside the financial statements, and
that value is added in the economy by auditing
it, let alone by incorporating it in earnings.
3. Financial reporting conveys an important economic
role by accurately and independently
counting actual outcomes, and hence confirming
prior information about expected outcomes.
In particular, if managers believe actual
outcomes are more likely to be reported accurately
and independently, they are less likely to
disclose misleading information about their expectations.
It is possible that, as a financial reporting
regime strays far from reporting
outcomes by incorporating more information
about expectations, the reliability of the available
information about expectations begins to
fall. A feasible outcome is that the amount of
information contained in the financial statements
rises, and at the same time the total
amount of information falls.21
4. Accounting standards and – what is more important
– accounting practice have long since
been imbued with one of the two sides of ‘fair
value’ accounting. That is, timely loss recognition,
in which expected future cash losses are
charged against current earnings and book
value of equity, is a long-standing property of
financial reporting. The other side of ‘fair
value,’ timely gain recognition, is not as prevalent
in practice (Basu, 1997). Loss recognition
timeliness is particularly evident in commonlaw
countries such as Australia, Canada, UK
and US (Ball et al., 2000). It affects financial
reporting practice in many ways, including the
pervasive ‘lower of cost or market’ rule (for example,
accruing expected decreases in the future
realisable value of inventory against
current earnings, but not expected increases),
accruing loss contingency provisions (but setting
a higher standard for verification of gain
contingencies), and long term asset impairment
charges (but not upward revaluations). It simply
is incorrect to view the prevailing financial
reporting model as ‘historical cost accounting’.
Financial reporting, particularly in commonlaw
countries, is a mixed process involving
both historical costs and (especially contingent
on losses) fair values.
In sum, I have mixed views about the extent to
which IFRS are becoming imbued with the current
IASB/FASB fascination with ‘fair value accounting’.
On the one hand, this philosophy promises to
incorporate more information in the financial
statements than hitherto. On the other, it does not
necessarily make investors better off and its usefulness
in other contexts has not been clearly
demonstrated. Worse, it could make investors and
other users worse off, for a variety of reasons. The
jury is still out on this issue.
14 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
20 Barth, Clinch and Shibano (2003) provide some theoretical
support for the proposition that recognition matters per se,
though the result flows directly from the model’s assumptions.
Ball, Robin and Sadka (2006) argue that equity investors are
relatively indifferent between receiving a given amount of information
(i.e., controlling for the amount of noise) via disclosure
and via recognition in the financial statements.
Conversely, they argue that the demand for recognition versus
disclosure arises primarily from the use of financial statements
in debt markets.
21 See Ball (2001: 133–138) for elaboration.
6. Effect on investors of uneven
implementation
I believe there are overwhelming political and economic
reasons to expect IFRS enforcement to be
uneven around the world, including within
Europe. Substantial international differences in financial
reporting practice and financial reporting
quality are inevitable, international standards or no
international standards. This conclusion is based
on the premise that – despite increased globalisation
– most political and economic influences on
financial reporting practice remain local. It is reinforced
by a brief review of the comparatively
toothless body of international enforcement agencies
currently in place. The conclusion also is supported
by a fledgling academic literature on the
relative roles of accounting standards and the incentives
of financial-statement preparers in determining
actual financial reporting practice.
One concern that arises from widespread IFRS
adoption is that investors will be mislead into believing
that there is more uniformity in practice
than actually is the case and that, even to sophisticated
investors, international differences in reporting
quality now will be hidden under the rug of
seemingly uniform standards. In addition, uneven
implementation curtails the ability of uniform
standards to reduce information costs and information
risk, described above as an advantage to investors
of IFRS. Uneven implementation could
increase information processing costs to transnational
investors – by burying accounting inconsistencies
at a deeper and less transparent level than
differences in standards. In my view, IFRS implementation
has not received sufficient attention,
perhaps because it lies away from public sight,
‘under the rug’.
6.1. Markets and politics remain primarily local,
not global
The fundamental reason for being sceptical
about uniformity of implementation in practice is
that the incentives of preparers (managers) and enforcers
(auditors, courts, regulators, boards, block
shareholders, politicians, analysts, rating agencies,
the press) remain primarily local.
All accounting accruals (versus simply counting
cash) involve judgments about future cash flows.
Consequently, there is much leeway in implementing
accounting rules. Powerful local economic and
political forces therefore determine how managers,
auditors, courts regulators and other parties influence
the implementation of rules. These forces
have exerted a substantial influence on financial
reporting practice historically, and are unlikely
to suddenly cease doing so, IFRS or no IFRS.
Achieving uniformity in accounting standards
seems easy in comparison with achieving uniformity
in actual reporting behaviour. The latter
would require radical change in the underlying
economic and political forces that determine actual
behaviour.
Sir David Tweedie, IASB chairman, premises
the case for international uniformity in accounting
standards on global integration of markets:22
‘As the world’s capital markets integrate, the
logic of a single set of accounting standards is evident.
A single set of international standards will
enhance comparability of financial information
and should make the allocation of capital across
borders more efficient. The development and acceptance
of international standards should also reduce
compliance costs for corporations and
improve consistency in audit quality.’
But this logic works both ways. One can change
the underlying premise to make a case against uniformity.
Because capital markets are not perfectly
integrated (debt markets in particular), and because
more generally economic and political integration
are both far from being complete, the logic
of national differences should be equally evident.
While increased internationalisation of markets
and politics can be expected to reduce some of the
diversity in accounting practice across nations, nations
continue to display clear and substantial domestic
facets in both their politics and how their
markets are structured, so increased internationalisation
cannot be expected to eliminate diversity in
practice.
I have heard an analogy made between IFRS and
the metric system of uniform weights and measures.
23 The analogy is far from exact, but instructive
nevertheless. There is an old saying: ‘The
weight of the butcher’s thumb on the scale is heavier
in ... [other country X].’ Despite uniform measurement
rules, the butcher’s discretion in
implementing them is limited only by the practised
eye of the customer, by concern for reputation, and
by the monitoring of state and private inspection
systems. The lesson from this saying is that monitoring
mechanisms operate differently across nations.
There is considerably more discretion in
implementing financial reporting rules than in
International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 15
22 Considering the amount of time the IASB has exerted in
lobbying governments (the EU included) on IFRS adoption,
there is some irony in Sir David focusing on international integration
of markets, without mentioning integration of political
forces. The strongly adverse initial reaction to the
publication of Watts (1977) and Watts and Zimmerman
(1978), introducing the topic of political influences on financial
reporting practice, suggests this is a sensitive issue.
23 The metric system was first proposed in 1791, was adopted
by the French revolutionary assembly in 1795, and was
substantially refined and widely adopted during the second
half of the nineteenth century (primarily in code law countries).
France then ceded control of the system to an international
body, and in 1875 the leading industrialised countries
(including the US, but not the UK) created the International
Bureau of Weights and Measures to administer it.
weighing meat, and consequently this is offset by
considerably more complex, frequent and effective
financial reporting monitoring mechanisms. But
here too the monitoring mechanisms operate differently
across nations.
Before getting too carried away with globalisation,
it is worth remembering that in fact most
markets and most politics are local, not global. The
late Tip O’Neill, long-time speaker of the US
House of Representatives, famously stated
(O’Neill, 1993): ‘All politics is local.’ Much the
same could be said about markets. Important dimensions
in which the world still looks considerably
more local than global include:
• Extent and nature of government involvement
in the economy;
• Politics of government involvement in financial
reporting practices (e.g., political influence
of managers, corporations, labour unions,
banks);
• Legal systems (e.g., common versus code law;
shareholder litigation rules);
• Securities regulation and regulatory bodies;
• Depth of financial markets;
• Financial market structure (e.g., closeness of relationship
between banks and client companies);
• The roles of the press, financial analysts and
rating agencies;
• Size of the corporate sector;
• Structure of corporate governance (e.g., relative
roles of labour, management and capital);
• Extent of private versus public ownership of
corporations;
• Extent of family-controlled businesses;
• Extent of corporate membership in relatedcompany
groups (e.g., Japanese keiretsu or
Korean chaebol);
• Extent of financial intermediation;
• The role of small shareholders vs. institutions
and corporate insiders;
• The use of financial statement information, including
earnings, in management compensation;
and
• The status, independence, training and compensation
of auditors.
The above list is far from complete, but it gives
some sense of the extent to which financial reporting
occurs in a local, not global, context. Despite
increased globalisation, the clear majority of economic
and political activity remains intranational,
the implication being that the primary driving
forces behind the majority of actual accounting
practices seem likely to remain domestic in nature
for the foreseeable future.
The most visible effect of local political and economic
factors on IFRS lies at the level of the national
standard adoption decision.24 This already
has occurred to a minor degree, in the EU ‘carve
out’ from IAS 39 in the application of fair value
accounting to interest rate hedges. The European
version of IAS 39 emerged in response to considerable
political pressure from the government of
France, which responded to pressure from domestic
banks concerned about balance sheet volatility.
25 Episodes like this are bound to occur in the
future, whenever reports prepared under IFRS produce
outcomes that adversely affect local interests.
Another level at which local political and economic
factors are likely to visibly influence IFRS
adoption stems from the latitude IFRS give to
firms to choose among alternative accounting
methods.26 Local factors make it unlikely that this
discretion will be exercised uniformly across
countries, and across firms within countries.
Nevertheless, in my view the most likely effect
of local politics and local market realities on IFRS
will be much less visible than was the case with
the prolonged political debate on IAS 39. I believe
the primary effect of local political and market factors
will lie under the surface, at the level of implementation,
which is bound to be substantially
inconsistent across nations.
Does anyone seriously believe that implementation
will be of equal standard in all the nearly 100
countries, listed in Figure 1, that have announced
adoption of IFRS in one way or another? The list
of adopters ranges from countries with developed
accounting and auditing professions and developed
capital markets (such as Australia) to countries
without a similarly developed institutional
background (such as Armenia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Egypt, Kenya, Kuwait, Nepal, Tobago
and Ukraine).
Even within the EU, will implementation of
IFRS be at an equal standard in all countries? The
list includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece,
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and
16 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
24 Zeff (2006) surveys political influences on standard adoptions
in the US, Canada, the UK and Sweden, and also in relation
to IFRS.
25 In my view, governments will not in practice cede the decision
to impair banks’ balance sheets to accountants. In the
event of a financial crisis, there is strong political pressure to
not mark banks’ balance sheets to market, in order to avoid
bank closures resulting from violating prudential ratios, as
witnessed in Japan over the last decade.
26 See Watts (1977) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986).
the UK. It is well known that uniform EU economic
rules in general are not implemented evenly, with
some countries being notorious standouts.27 What
makes financial reporting rules different?
Accounting accruals generally require at least
some element of subjective judgment and hence
can be influenced by the incentives of managers
and auditors. Consider the case of IAS 36 and IAS
38, which require periodic review of long term
tangible and intangible assets for possible impairment
to fair value. Do we seriously believe that
managers and auditors will comb through firms’
asset portfolios to discover economically impaired
assets with the same degree of diligence and ruthlessness
in all the countries that adopt IFRS? Will
auditors, regulators, courts, boards, analysts, rating
agencies, the press and other monitors of corporate
financial reporting provide the same degree of
oversight in all IFRS-adopting countries? In the
event of a severe economic downturn creating
widespread economic impairment of companies’
assets, will the political and regulatory sectors of
all countries be equally likely to turn a blind eye?
Will they be equally sympathetic to companies
failing to record economic impairment on their accounting
balance sheets, in order to avoid loan default
or bankruptcy (as did Japanese banks for an
extended period)? Will local political and economic
factors cease to exert the influence on actual
financial reporting practice that they have in the
past? Or will convergence among nations in adopted
accounting standards lead to an offsetting divergence
in the extent to which they are
implemented?
The drift toward fair value accounting in IFRS
will only accentuate the extent to which IFRS implementation
depends on manager and auditor
judgment, and hence is subject to local political
and economic influence. Furthermore, the clear
majority of IFRS adopting countries cannot be said
to possess deep securities, derivatives and currency
markets. Implementation of the IFRS fair value
accounting standards in many countries will encounter
problems with illiquidity, wide spreads
and subjectivity in ‘mark to model’ estimates of
fair value. Furthermore, in many countries the
available information needed to implement the
asset impairment standards is meagre and not readily
observable to auditors and other monitors. To
make matters worse, the countries in which there
will be greater room to exercise judgment under
fair value accounting, due to lower-liquidity markets
and poorer information about asset impairment,
are precisely the countries with weaker local
enforcement institutions (audit profession, legal
protection, regulation, and so on). Judgment is a
generic property of accounting standard implementation,
but worldwide reliance on judgment
has been widely expanded under IFRS by the drift
to fair value accounting and by the adoption of fair
value standards in countries with illiquid markets.
It is worth bearing in mind that from the outset
the IASC, the precursor to the IASB, has been
strongly supported by the ‘G4+1’ common law
countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK
and US) which have comparatively deep markets
and comparatively developed shareholders’ rights,
auditing professions, and other monitoring systems.
Its philosophy has been tilted toward a common-
law view of financial reporting (a topic
discussed further below). This view forms the
foundation for accounting standards that require
timely recognition of losses, in particular the asset
impairment standards IAS 36 and IAS 38.
Historically, common-law financial reporting has
exhibited a substantially greater propensity to
recognise economic losses in a timely fashion than
financial reporting in Continental Europe and Asia
(Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Ball et al., 2003).
Implementation of IAS 36 and IAS 38 requires
subjective assessments of future cash flows, sometimes
decades into the future, and thus is subject to
a large degree of discretion. It remains to be seen
if managers, auditors, regulators and other monitors
outside of the common-law countries will be
persuaded by IFRS adoption that it is in their interests
to radically change their behaviour.
In sum, even a cursory review of the political
and economic diversity among IFRS-adopting nations,
and of their past and present financial reporting
practices, makes the notion that uniform
standards alone will produce uniform financial reporting
seems naive. This conclusion is strengthened
by the following review of the weak
international IFRS enforcement mechanisms that
are in place, and by a review of the relevant literature
on the relative roles of accounting standards
and the reporting incentives of financial statement
preparers (i.e., managers and auditors).
6.2. IFRS enforcement mechanisms
Under its constitution, the IASB is a standardsetter
and does not have an enforcement mechanism
for its standards: it can cajole countries and
companies to adopt IFRS in name, but it cannot require
their enforcement in practice. It cannot penalise
individual companies or countries that adopt
its standards, but in which financial reporting practice
is of low quality because managers, auditors
and local regulators fail to fully implement the
standards. Nor has it shown any interest in disal-
International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 17
27 For example, the Financial Times (July 19, 2005) reports
that ‘Italy has the worst record of all European Union member
states when it comes to implementing the laws that underpin
the EU’s internal market, according to data released by the
European Commission yesterday. ... The worst performers
apart from Italy are Luxembourg, Greece, the Czech Republic
and Portugal.’
lowing or even dissuading low-quality companies
or countries from using its ‘brand name’.
Individual countries remain primarily regulators of
their own financial markets, EU member countries
included. That exposes IFRS to the risk of adoption
in name only.
Worldwide regulatory bodies generally are regarded
as toothless watchdogs, despite recent attempts
to strengthen them. The ‘alphabet soup’ of
international regulators now includes:
• International Auditing and Assurance
Standards Board (IAASB), a committee of the
International Federation of Accountants
(IFAC). IAASB issues and promotes uniform
auditing practices worldwide, but lacks effective
enforcement powers.
• International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), an umbrella organisation
of national regulators. IOSCO develops
and promotes securities regulation standards
and their enforcement. It encourages member
countries to adopt IFRS, but does not police
their enforcement.
• Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB), established
in February 2005 by IOSCO, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS),
the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS), the World Bank, and the
Financial Stability Forum. PIOB will oversee
IFAC’s standard-setting activities in audit performance,
independence, ethics, quality control,
assurance and education. In relation to
enforcement, it will oversee IFAC’s Member
Body Compliance Program.
European regulatory bodies include:
• Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR). CESR promulgates high-level IFRS
enforcement principles.
• EU Directive on Statutory Audit of Annual
Accounts and Consolidated Accounts. The EU
Directive mandates EU-wide auditing standards.
Whether these bodies will substantially harmonise
actual reporting behaviour in not yet clear.
Even if all IFRS-adopting nations agreed to fully
cede their sovereignty over regulation of financial
reporting to these transnational bodies, which
seems highly doubtful, domestic political and economic
forces most likely would cause them to abrogate
that agreement whenever it suited them.28
6.3. Standards versus incentives
An emerging literature investigates the extent to
which differences in actual reporting behaviour are
endogenous (i.e., determined by real economic and
political factors that are local in nature and that
differ among countries). The relevance of this literature
to IFRS implemenation is the implication
that, to the extent financial reporting practice is endogenous,
an exogenously-developed set of accounting
standards is unlikely to materially change
firms’ actual reporting behaviour. Complete endogeneity
would imply that change in financial reporting
would occur only if there was change in
the real economic and political factors that determine
it – for example, it would imply that uniform
financial reporting would only occur under perfectly
integrated world markets and political systems,
uniform standards notwithstanding. Partial
endogeneity would imply that adopting uniform
international standards would have some, but limited,
success in overcoming national differences in
the real economic and political factors that determine
actual practice, and hence in reducing differences
in financial reporting practice.
Research on the economic and political factors
that influence financial reporting practice internationally
includes Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000);
Pope and Walker (1999); Ball, Robin and Wu
(2000, 2003); Ali and Hwang (2000); Leuz (2003);
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003); Bushman,
Piotroski and Smith (2004, 2006); Bushman and
Piotroski (2006); Ball, Robin and Sadka (2006);
and Leuz and Oberholzer (2006). One contribution
of this research is to document substantial differences
among countries in reporting behavior that
are endogenously determined by local economic
and political factors. This evidence implies that
adopting uniform IFRS would not fully overcome
national differences in financial reporting practice.
A related contribution is more direct evidence that
exogenously imposed standards do not substantially
influence financial reporting quality.
Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) investigate differences
in financial reporting quality between
common-law and code-law countries.29 Common
law takes its name from the process whereby laws
originate: it its pure form, common law arises from
what is commonly accepted to be appropriate practice.
Common law originated in England and
spread to its former colonies (US, Canada,
18 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
28 A recent parallel is France’s refusal to enforce EU
takeover rules, which has led to considerable watering down
of the rules after a decade of negotiation. In the meantime,
France announced it would block rumoured takeovers of
Groupe Danone SA by the US company PepsiCo Inc., and of
Suez SA by Italy’s Enel SpA. As a result of France’s political
position, EU rules have been loosened so that member states
now have wide latitude to set their own standards in relation
to takeover defences. The notion of an integrated European
market for corporate control thereby has been considerably diluted.
The lesson is that global rules will prevail so long as
they do not run foul of important local interests. Why would
financial reporting rules be any different?
29 Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) was replicated and extended
(the publication dates are misleading) by Pope and
Walker (1999).
Australia, New Zealand). It tends to be more market-
oriented, supports a proportionately larger listed
corporate sector, is more litigious, tends to
presume that investors are outsiders ‘at arm’slength’
from the company, and hence is more likely
to presume that investors rely on timely public
disclosure and financial reporting. Financial reporting
practice (and rules) emphasises timely
recognition of losses in the financial statements.
Earnings are more volatile, more informative, and
more closely-followed by investors and analysts.
Unlike code law, common law in its purest form
makes standard-setting a private-sector responsibility.
Code law also takes its name from the process
whereby laws, including financial reporting rules,
are created: they are ‘coded’ in the public sector.
Politically powerful stakeholder groups necessarily
are represented in both codifying and implementing
rules. Code law originated in Continental
Europe and spread to the former colonies of
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and
Spain. Code-law countries generally are less market-
oriented, have proportionately larger government
and unlisted private-company sectors, are
less litigious, and are more likely to operate an ‘insider
access’ model with less emphasis on public
financial reporting and disclosure. There is less
emphasis on timely recognition of losses in the
public financial statements, and earnings have
lower volatility and lower informativeness.
Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) study four East Asian
countries. They argue that the companies in these
countries are more likely to be members of related
corporate groups, including those under family
control, in which a version of the ‘insider access’
model operates and hence there is less emphasis
than under common law on public financial reporting
and disclosure. While the specific politically
powerful stakeholder groups are different
than in typical code-law countries (notably, organised
labour typically has less political clout in Asia
than in code law countries), governments play a
similar role in the economy.
In practice, the distinction between the code-law,
common-law and Asian groupings is blurred (for
example, where does one place Hong Kong over
time?). Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) and Ball,
Robin and Wu (2003) use the categories as an imperfect
proxy for the extent and type of political
involvement in the economy, and hence of the extent
to which political (versus market) factors influence
finacial reporting practice. Countries with
highly politicised economies are more likely to
politicise financial reporting practice, but they also
tend to gravitate toward an ‘insider access’ (versus
public disclosure) model and to grant politically
powerful stakeholder groups an important role.
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) eschew countrytype
classifications and employ the more-detailed
legal-system variables reported in La Porta et al.
(1997, 1998), though in a different context Ball,
Robin and Sadka (2006) report evidence that country-
type variables work better, consistent with the
view that detailed institutional variables are endogenously
determined by more primitive political
and economic factors. Which approach better explains
international differences in financial reporting
practice is an interesting and not fully resolved
issue. Nevertheless, all studies indicate that differences
in actual reporting behavior are endogenous
(i.e., determined by real economic and political
factors that differ among countries).
Some idea of international differences in financial
reporting quality can be obtained from Figure
2, which summarises results in Ball, Kothari and
Robin (2000) and Ball, Robin and Wu (2000,
2003). The three panels graph the sensitivity of reported
earnings to contemporary economic gains
and losses, as measured imperfectly by fiscal-year
stock returns (details are provided in the source articles).
The heights of the bars represent estimates
of the sensitivity of earnings to contemporary economic
gains (black bars) and to contemporary economic
losses (white bars) in a particular country or
group of countries. These sensitivity estimates
capture the timeliness of gain and loss recognition
in the countries and country groups – important attributes
of financial reporting quality.30
Panel A summarises the results for three country
groups: common-law, code-law and East Asia.
Panels B and C provide estimates for a selection of
individual countries. Differences in financial reporting
practice among the three groups are readily
apparent. The most notable difference is the
considerably higher sensitivity of earnings to contemporary
economic losses in the common-law
category. This evidence of timelier recognition of
economic losses under common-law accounting is
consistent with the greater emphasis on shareholder
value in common-law countries.
The converse is especially relevant to doubts
about the quality of IFRS implementation that will
occur, over time, outside of common-law countries.
Timelier loss recognition is less likely in
countries where managers are more protected, and
shareholders have a lesser role in governance, because
it puts unwelcome pressure on managers to
fix their loss-making investments and strategies
International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 19
30 Starting with Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), researchers
have been concerned that the estimates reported in Figure 2
could differ in reliability (or bias) across countries and groups,
because they rely on share price data. While Ball, Kothari and
Robin (2000: 48) note several reasons to discount this concern,
researchers have developed other tests, which corroborate
the price-based results. These include tests based on the
time series of reported earnings (Ball and Robin, 1999; Ball,
Robin and Wu, 2003) and accruals-based tests (Ball and
Shivakumar, 2005; Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2006).
20 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Figure 2
Timeliness of earnings historically has depended on countries’ political and economic institutions
Panel A
Common-law, Code-law and East Asia country groups
Panel B
Some individual Common-law and Code-law countries
Earnings Sensitivity to Current
Year Gains and Losses
Earnings Sensitivity to Current
Year Gains and Losses
more quickly, and to undertake fewer negative-
NPV investments in the first place. For example,
timely loss recognition helps to curb managers’ appetites
for ‘pet’ projects and ‘trophy’ acquisitions
that are socially wasteful and not in the shareholders’
interests (Ball, 2001; Ball and Shivakumar,
2005). It is not surprising that loss recognition
timeliness is lower on average in countries where
individual shareholders are deemed less important
and managers have more latitude to pursue their
own preferences. The key implementation question
is whether managers in countries whose systems
are less responsive to the interests of
shareholders will change their habits under IFRS,
and exercise their subjective judgment to a greater
degree in tying their own hands. I have my doubts.
China’s experience provides a more direct
source of evidence on the extent of IFRS implementation
when it is imposed by governments,
without change occurring in the fundamental economic
and political factors affecting financial reporting
practice. Ball, Robin and Wu (2000) study
China’s requirement that all domestic companies
with foreign shareholders publish financial statements
that conform to IFRS (then known as IAS)
and that are audited by an international accounting
firm. Many features of China’s institutional environment
militate against high-quality financial reporting,
among them being the prevalence of
‘insider’ networks, the strong political roles of the
Chinese government and army in the economy,
and the absence of shareholder litigation rights.
Ball, Robin, and Wu report that these institutional
features appear to swamp the effect of mandating
IAS. When reporting under international accounting
standards, the financial statements of Chinese
firms are no more timely in reflecting economic
gains or losses than when reporting under local
standards. This is shown graphically in Panel C of
Figure 2, where the sensitivities of Chinese earnings
to contemporary economic gains and losses
(i.e., estimates of gain and loss recognition timeliness)
resemble those of other Asian countries and
are substantially lower than the common-law
equivalents. China’s experience with mandating
IAS shows that it is difficult to achieve a noticeable
improvement in financial reporting quality in
practice by implanting exogenously developed accounting
standards into a complex institutional environment.
Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) argue that a similar
outcome is evident in the four East Asian countries
International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 21
Figure 2 (continued)
Timeliness of earnings historically has depended on countries’ political and economic institutions
Panel C
Some individual Asian countries
Sources: Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000); Ball, Robin and Wu (2000, 2003).
Earnings Sensitivity to Current
Year Gains and Losses
(Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand)
reported as a group in Panel A of Figure 2, and individually
in Panel C. Accounting standards in
these countries historically have been based on
British standards, on US GAAP and more recently
on IAS: that is, they have followed a fundamentally
common-law model. If implemented fully, these
standards should facilitate comparatively highquality
financial reporting, and timely loss recognition
in particular. However the outcome, evident
in the graphs, is different: earnings in the four East
Asian countries exhibit low sensitivity to both economic
gains and losses, in sharp contrast with the
common-law group.
An important implication of this area of research
is that international differences in financial reporting
practice occcur as an endogenous function of
local political and economic institutions, and that
importing an exogenously-developed set of accounting
standards will not necessarily change
firms’ actual reporting behavior in a material fashion.
The experiment in China is directly analogous
to the EU adopting IFRS, and the East Asian experience
provides a useful precedent also. Like
China and East Asia, Continental European countries
have predominantly code-law institutional
structures and preparer incentives. The experience
of those countries in importing international standards
derived from a common law view of financial
reporting illustrates the difficulty of obtaining
change in actual financial reporting practice by importing
exogenously developed accounting standards
into a complex political and economic
environment.31
6.4. Uneven implementation: overview
Uneven implementation of IFRS seems inevitable.
Accrual accounting (and fair value accounting
in particular) involves judgements about
future cash flows and thereby provides leeway in
IFRS implementation. Powerful local economic
and political forces determine how managers, auditors,
courts and regulators respond to that leeway.
Uneven implementation curtails the ability of
uniform standards to reduce information costs and
information risk. It could increase information
processing costs, by burying accounting inconsistencies
at a deeper and less transparent level than
more-readily observable differences in standards.
It threatens to curtail many of the potential benefits
of IFRS adoption.
I believe implementation issues deserve far
greater attention. There is an emerging academic
literature on the topic.32 Nevertheless, texts on national
financial accounting and on international accounting
usually contain elaborate expositions on
accounting standards, but little on the incentives of
preparers and how these systematically affect actual
financial reporting practice.33 The focus tends
to be on what the rules say, not on how they are
implemented in practice.
Implementation is the Achilles heel of IFRS.
There are overwhelming political and economic
reasons to expect IFRS enforcement to be uneven
around the world, including within Europe.
Substantial international differences in financial
reporting quality are inevitable, and my major concerns
are that investors will be mislead into believing
that there is more uniformity in practice
than actually is the case and that, even to sophisticated
investors, international differences in reporting
quality now will be hidden under the rug of
seemingly uniform standards.
7. Some longer term concerns
This section contains conjectures on some issues
of longer term concern. One concern is that allowing
unfettered use of the IFRS ‘brand name’ by
any country discards information about reporting
quality differences, and does not allow high-quality
financial reporting regimes to signal that they
follow better standards than low-quality regimes.
Another concern is that international standards reduce
competition among alternative financial reporting
systems, and hence reduce innovation.
Finally, while the IASB and its promulgated standards
historically have enjoyed – and currently do
enjoy – a strong ‘common law’ orientation, over
time the IASB risks becoming a politicised, polarised,
bureaucratic, UN-style body.
7.1. The IFRS brand name problem
In the presence of local political and economic
factors that exert substantial influence on local financial
reporting practice, and in the absence of an
effective worldwide enforcement mechanism, the
very meaning of IFRS adoption and the implications
of adoption are far from clear. In the enthusiasm
of the current moment, the IFRS ‘brand name’
currently is riding high, and IFRS adoption is
being perceived as a signal of quality. I am not sure
how long that perception will last.
22 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
31 Other evidence supports this conclusion. Leuz (2003) reports
that the financial reporting quality of German firms listed
on the New Market does not depend on their choice of US
GAAP or IFRS (presumably it is determined by preparers’ incentives,
not by accounting standards). Ball and Shivakumar
(2005) report substantial differences in reporting quality between
U.K. public and private firms, despite them using identical
accounting standards. Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006)
and Peek, Cuijpers and Buijink (2006) report similar evidence
for wider samples of EU public and private firms.
32 See: El-Gazzar, Finn and Jacob (1999), Street, Gray and
Bryant (1999), Street and Gray (2001, 2002), Street and
Bryant (2000), Murphy (2000), Aisbitt (2004) and Larson and
Street (2004).
33 See: Choi, Frost and Meek (1999), Mueller, Gernon and
Meek (1997), Nobes (1992), Nobes and Parker (1995) and
Radebaugh and Gray (1997).
In a famous model, Nobel laureate Michael
Spence (1973) introduced economics to the important
problem of credibly signalling one’s quality.
He argued that when a user wants to know the
quality levels of other economic agents, but available
information about quality is imperfect, the
higher-quality agents want to send signals to distinguish
themselves from those who are lowerquality.
But a signal will be credible to its recipient
only if the costs of signalling are negatively correlated
with actual quality. Unless it is more costly
for the lower-quality agents to claim they are of
high quality, they will join the high-quality agents
in making that claim. If the equilibrium then is that
every agent makes the same claim, the signal loses
its informativeness. The only way to make a signal
informative (i.e., obtain an equilibrium in which
only the higher-quality agents signal they are of
high quality) is for the system to incorporate a cost
of signalling that the lower-quality agents are not
prepared to pay.
Applying this reasoning to the hodgepodge of
100 or so IFRS adopters listed in Figure 1 is disquieting.
If investors want to know the reporting
quality levels of companies resident in a variety of
countries, but do not have complete knowledge
about the countries’ quality levels, then higherquality
countries might want to choose IFRS to
distinguish themselves from those of lower quality.
But the problem with IFRS adoption, as a signal
to investors about the financial reporting
quality of a preparer, is that it is almost costless for
all countries to signal that they are of high quality:
i.e., to adopt the highest available accounting standards
on paper. Worse, IFRS adoption most likely
costs less to the lower-quality countries, for two
reasons. First, the lower-quality regimes will incur
fewer economic and political costs of actually enforcing
the adopted standards. It is the higherquality
reporting regimes that are more likely to
incur the cost of actually enforcing IFRS, because
they have the institutions (such as a higher-quality
audit profession, more effective courts system,
better shareholder litigation rules) that are more
likely to require enforcement of whatever standards
are adopted. Second, by wholesale adoption
of IFRS, the lower-quality regimes can avoid the
costs of running their own standard-setting body,
which likely are proportionally higher than in larger
economies.34
The signalling equilibrium thus is likely to be
that both the lower-quality and the higher-quality
countries find it in their interest to adopt IFRS, so
the adoption decision becomes uninformative
about quality. Judging by the list of approximately
100 IFRS adopters, this is what has transpired. A
classic ‘free rider’ problem emerges: it is essentially
costless for low-quality countries to use the
IFRS ‘brand name,’ so they all do. If IFRS adoption
is a free good, what companies or countries
will not take it? When it is costless to say otherwise,
who is going to say: ‘We will not adopt high
standards’?
Figure 3 provides an example of a costless (and
hence useless) signal about quality: Enron
Corporation’s stated code of ethics, denoted ‘Our
Values’. This set of high ethical standards was reported
to the public in Enron’s 1998 Annual
Report, released early in 1999, at the height of the
company’s malfeasance in financial and energy
markets. Relatively speaking, it costs little to adopt
such standards and promote their adoption to the
public. Enforcing the standards is another matter:
in Enron’s case, that would have involved not only
the cost of inspection and audit of managerial behaviour,
but also the cost to managers of forgoing
opportunities to manipulate energy and capital
markets.
International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 23
34 This has been claimed to be an advantage of IFRS. No
doubt it is an advantage to the lower-quality adopters, but it is
difficult to see it as a long term advantage to international financial
reporting in general.
Figure 3
An example of a costless (hence useless) signal about quality
Our Values
RESPECT: We treat others as we would like to be treated ourselves. We do not tolerate abusive or disrespectful
treatment. Ruthlessness, callousness, and arrogance don’t belong here.
INTEGRITY: We work with customers and prospects openly, honestly, and sincerely. When we say we will do
something, we will do it; when we say we cannot or will not do something, then we won’t do it.
COMMUNICATION: We have an obligation to communicate. Here, we take the time to talk to one another …
and to listen. We believe that information is meant to move and that information moves people.
EXCELLENCE: We are satisfied with nothing less than the very best in everything we do. We will continue to
raise the bar for everyone. The great fun here will be for all of us to discover just how good we can really be.
Source: Enron Corporation, 1998 Annual Report.
The only way to make the IFRS signal informative
about quality is for the worldwide financial reporting
system to incorporate a cost of signalling
that the lower-quality agents are not prepared to
pay. This would necessitate an effective worldwide
enforcement mechanism, under which countries
that adopt but do not effectively implement IFRS
are either penalised or prohibited from using the
IFRS brand name. In the absence of an effective
worldwide enforcement mechanism (which I believe
would be a bad idea for different reasons, discussed
below), it is essentially costless for
low-quality countries to use the IFRS ‘brand
name’, and local political and economic factors inevitably
will exert substantial influence on local financial
reporting practice, IFRS adoption
notwithstanding.
If allowing all countries to use the IFRS label
discards the information in accounting standards
about reporting quality differences, then the available
quality signal could become the quality of the
enforcement of standards, not standards per se.
The major reason to expect enforcement – not
mere adoption of standards – to be a credible signal
is that it is more costly for low-quality countries
to adopt high enforcement standards, because
this would run counter to local political and economic
interests. The Spence signalling model predicts
a separation between low-quality and
high-quality actors. One possibility thus is that
high-quality financial reporting regimes will join a
group whose member countries subject the enforcement
standards of their companies to group
inspection. This is one interpretation of the ‘convergence’
process being followed by the US, the
outcome of which seems likely to be adopting essentially
the same standards as IFRS, but without
using the IFRS ‘brand name’. The irony of these
types of possible outcome is that IFRS might simply
shift the dimension on which international differences
and coalitions occur from accounting
standards (as previously) to enforcement standards.
7.2. Competition and innovation among systems
Competition breeds innovation, encourages
adaptation, dispels complacency and penalises bureaucracy.
International competition among economic
systems in general is healthy. Imposing
worldwide standards therefore is a risky centralisation
process in any sphere of economic activity.
I am aware of no compelling reason why international
competition among financial reporting systems
is no less desirable than in other spheres, and
should not be encouraged.35
I am particularly concerned about the long run
implications of countries downgrading the resources
and status of – and even eliminating – their
national standard-setting bodies. I therefore am a
keener advocate of ‘convergence’ than of outright
IFRS adoption (yet another reason to suspect, or at
least hope, that national differences will prevail
over international uniformity).
7.3. Long-term politics, polarisation and
bureaucracy
The final longer-term concern is the risk of the
IASB (or its successor) becoming a representative,
politicised, polarised, bureaucratic, UN-style body.
The IASB and its promulgated standards historically
have – and currently do – enjoy a strong
‘common law’ orientation. How long that will last
is another matter.
The IASC was founded in 1973 by professional
accountancy bodies in Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, United
Kingdom and Ireland, and the United States. Since
then, there has been a drift towards international
representation. Currently, the International
Accounting Standards Committee Foundation has
six trustees from the Asia/Oceania region, six from
Europe, six from North America and four from any
region of the world. In spite of this drift, IFRS currently
reflect a strong common-law philosophy.
The current membership representation and philosophy
of the IASB seem likely to face challenges
in the longer term. Over time, each of the 100 or so
IFRS-adopting nations will have a politically-legitimate
argument that they deserve some sort of
representation in the standard-setting process. Do
not the standards that are chosen by the IASB affect
their countries, too?
8. Faith, hope and parity
Uniform reporting rules worldwide – parity for all
– seems a great virtue. And there is no doubting
that at least some convergence of standards seems
desirable – and inevitable – in an increasingly
globalised world. The adoption of IFRS by almost
100 countries, and the convergence processes currently
underway, are testimony to increased globalisation
– as well as to the quality and influence
of IFRS.
Nevertheless, a note of caution is required, for
reasons that include:
1. Internationally uniform accounting rules are a
leap of faith, untested by experience or by a
significant body of academic results.
2. The emphasis in IFRS on fair value accounting
is a concern, particularly in relation to reporting
in lesser-developed nations.
3. The incentives of preparers (managers) and enforcers
(auditors, courts, regulators, politi-
24 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
35 Arguments for international competition among accounting
standards are made by Dye (1985), Ball (1995), Dye and
Verrecchia (1995) and Dye and Sunder (2001).
cians) remain primarily local, and inevitably
will create differences in financial reporting
quality that will tend to be ‘swept under the
rug’ of uniformity.
4. It is essentially costless to say one has the highest
standards, so even the lowest-quality reporting
regimes will be attracted to free use of
the IFRS ‘brand name’.
5. Uniform international standards reduce competition
among systems.
6. The long run implication of global politics
could well be that the IASB (or its long run
successor) becomes a representative, politicised,
polarised, bureaucratic, UN-style body.
Few would disagree that some degree of uniformity
in accounting rules at every level – firm, industry,
country, or globe – is optimal. Exactly how
much is a long-unresolved issue. And few would
dispute that widening globalisation of markets and
politics implies some narrowing of rule differences
among nations, though here too the optimal degree
of uniformity is far from clear. IFRS adoption is an
economic and political experiment – a leap of faith
– and only time will tell what the pros and cons of
IFRS to investors turn out to be.
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